I INTRODUCTION
Excessive CEO pay is the mad cow disease of American boardrooms. It moves from company to company, rendering directors incapable of applying common sense.
-J Richard Finlay, Chairman, Center for Corporate and Public Governance.* 1
The recent succession of high profile corporate collapses, such as HIH and One.Tel in Australia and Enron and WorldCom in the United States, sent a clear Shakespearian message that there is often a misalignment between appearance and reality in the commercial world. It is interesting to note the extent to which executive remuneration appears as a subtext in many of these collapses.2
There is a tendency to view executive remuneration as a specialised topic, isolated from other areas of corporate law. Yet such segregation is misleading and may lead to dangerous tunnel vision. Executive remuneration presents traditional problems of corporate governance in a highly concentrated form. Nowhere else do the conflicts of interest in corporate governance lie so close to the surface. executives, based upon the unexpired portion of the employment contract, is exacerbated in Australia where longer employment contracts for executives are more common than in jurisdictions such as the US or UK. 16 A number of other controversial examples of termination pay have followed since the Trumbull affair, including A$15 million payments granted by Coles Myer17 and Lend Lease.18 Also, in 2001, '[tjapping into a rich vein of community outrage', Kim Beazley, then leader of the federal Opposition, attacked a payment by Pacific Dunlop to its retiring CEO.19 Finally, it appears that AMP Ltd's tradition of generous termination payments will be upheld with the recent announcement of the early departure of its CEO, Paul Batchelor.20 Another highly publicised incident concerning severance pay involved a proposed A$638 000 payment to the former chair of the demutualised NRMA Insurance, Nicholas Whitlam. Minority shareholders who objected to the payment sought to pass a special resolution at NRMA's annual general meeting requiring the board to seek shareholder approval for any such retirement payments. The resolution, which would have given shareholders greater control over the approval of retirement benefits, ultimately failed although a substantial number of shareholders voted in favour of it. 21 The impact of globalisation, and the so-called 'global market in talent',22 has also been apparent in the escalation of executive pay in Australia.23 Whereas Australia, with a pay increase of approximately A$1 million between 2000 and 2001. Furthermore, a number of senior NAB executives in the US associated with the HomeSide debacle had nonetheless received large performance bonuses. 31 In other cases, while corporate performance may have been good, the rhetoric of alignment of interests between management and shareholders lacked credibility. Although Adelaide Bank made a record profit for 2000-01, the board decided to increase its chief executive's salary by 30 per cent while refusing any increase in the dividend payment to shareholders.32
Another source of shareholder resentment relates to performance hurdles in option grants. Although traditionally absent from US executive option packages, performance hurdles have been a familiar feature of option grants in Australia for many years.33 Nonetheless, these hurdles are often criticised as being inadequate. In 2001, shareholders of Goodman Fielder Ltd criticised the terms of an option package to the company's new managing director, on the basis that the structure of the option grant presented 'no real challenge '.34 Although shareholders are increasingly interested in the question of executive remuneration,35 with the issue often generating heated debate at general meetings, the power of shareholders to challenge executive remuneration plans is generally weak.36 To date it has been relatively rare for shareholder resolutions to succeed in blocking remuneration packages at Australian general meetings.37 Litigation in this area has been infrequent and is generally more likely to be successful in the close corporation context.38 Nonetheless, a number of superannuation funds in Australia have recently indicated that they intend to take a more activist stance against large executive option grants in forthcoming annual general meetings.39 Also, institutional shareholders in Australia played an important role in lobbying for more stringent disclosure requirements for executive remuneration,40 which were introduced under the Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth).41 At a global level too, fund managers are subjecting executive remuneration to greater scrutiny. The International Corporate Governance Network ('ICGN'), which represents approximately US$10 trillion in assets, recently proposed a 10 point code of conduct to improve transparency and accountability in relation to executive pay, including a recommendation that investing institutions increase their level of analysis of remuneration structures.42
In some instances management has clearly responded to the possibility of shareholder or general community backlash relating to executive pay.43 For example, following the revelation by Qantas that up to 2000 workers would be retrenched and a call for a wage freeze for remaining workers, the company's CEO announced that senior executives would forgo their right to substantial performance bonuses.44
The most recent example of the potential power of the 'outrage factor' in Australia is in relation to option schemes. In August 2002, soon after a statement by the Commonwealth Bank that it would suspend its executive option scheme,45 Paul Batchelor, the CEO of AMP, announced that he intended to seek an extension of the vesting date for his option package.46 Such was the public backlash in response to this announcement, that Mr Batchelor reversed his decision the following day.47
I ll EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION AND CORPORATE THEORY
Money, it's a crime. Share it fairly, but don't take a slice of my pie.
-Pink Floyd 48
Corporate law has employed at least three basic techniques in attempting to control the conflicts of interest that exist in relation to executive remuneration. The first of these is self-constraint (with judicial enforcement) via fiduciary duties. The second technique involves eliminating or controlling conflicts of interest through corporate governance techniques, such as the use of independent directors, remuneration committees and greater control by shareholders. It is unsurprising that the mantra of 'arm's-length dealing' reverberates through contemporary corporate governance practices. The final way of dealing with the problem has been to accept the existence of managerial self-interest, but to try to align that self-interest with the interests of shareholders. This technique does not attempt to overcome managerial self-interest, but rather to harness it for the benefit of shareholders.
At an international level, led by US corporate governance models, the spotlight has shifted away from the first regulatory mechanism in the last decade towards the other two techniques. The second technique underpins many of the recent corporate governance reforms recommended by the New York Stock Exchange ('NYSE') Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee,49 which were ratified by the board of directors of the NYSE on 1 August 2002. The NYSE reforms, for example, place great emphasis on the independent director as a 'cleansing agent'50 in corporate governance. The reforms require listed companies to have a majority of independent directors,51 and to have a compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors.52 There is also a provision increasing shareholder control over equity compensation plans.53
The third 'alignment of interests' technique represents a particularly important paradigm shift in the theory underpinning executive remuneration.54 This paradigm shift provided the foundation for the rise of performance-based pay and option grants as a component of executive remuneration. The device of tying CEO compensation to increases in share prices or to other accounting-based performance targets was viewed as an effective way of aligning managerial and shareholder interests, and providing management with the incentive to take risks.55 An additional virtue of performance-based pay was that it operated as a 'self-executing' governance technique, without the need for shareholder supervision or judicial enforcement.56 And performance-based pay held out the promise of remuneration according to 'just deserts'. It was represented as a legitimising device, which would reward the deserving and penalise the unworthy in corporate management. This paradigm shift reflected an even more fundamental shift in corporate theory from an entity theory of the corporation to a nexus of contracts model, which is now viewed as orthodoxy.57
Two main factors drove the rise to dominance of performance-based pay coupled with option grants. These were, first, the fact that US tax laws gave The paradigm shift of the last decade has, however, been criticised for some time by a number of commentators at both a theoretical level, and at a practical level. In terms of corporate theory, the alignment of interests model of executive remuneration is based upon a shareholder-centred theory of the corporation. Yet, in recent years, some academic commentators have questioned the appropriateness of a shareholder-centred model of the corporation, and suggested that a more inclusive model, recognising the contribution of a wider range of actors, including employees, more closely reflects the modem corporation.61 It has been argued that a narrow focus on shareholder returns under performancebased pay is undesirable, since improving shareholder wealth does not necessarily improve social wealth62 and can create perverse incentives towards short-termism.63
Also, a shareholder-centred model of the corporation is by no means universally adopted in comparative corporate governance. Professor Brian Cheffins has noted, for example, that in Germany the concept of profit maximisation for shareholders 'has typically not been an overriding priority'. Rather the German corporate system traditionally aimed to balance the interests of the various constituencies associated with the corporation.64 Although in recent years there has been increasing convergence between the US and German systems,65 post-Enron and WorldCom there has been considerable backlash in Europe against the US model of corporate governance66 and it is therefore difficult to predict the extent to which convergence will continue.67 Under the alignment of interests model of executive remuneration, the actual level of pay is immaterial.68 It is ironic that a remuneration technique, which was designed to achieve greater managerial accountability, ushered in an era of unparalleled increases in executive pay. Critics of the escalating levels of executive remuneration have argued that excessive remuneration can be damaging to worker morale,69 and indeed to the economy as a whole.70 Also, massive inequality in the distribution of wealth in society can lead to a loss of social cohesion71 and result in political backlash.72
It has also become apparent, even to commentators who support the theoretical foundation of die alignment of interests model of executive remuneration, that as a result of structural deficiencies, there is often a significant gap between the rhetoric and the practical operation of many performance-based pay schemes.73 Common structural deficiencies in many remuneration packages include a weak link between pay and performance with low, and easily achievable, targets74 and insufficient downside risk for poor performance.75 There is also scepticism about the existence of a causal connection between pay and performance, and whether increased corporate profits are actually attributable to exceptional performance by executives. David Knott, chairman of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ('ASIC'), recently made this point, stating '[t]he market price of shares, as the past decade has shown, is influenced significantly by external factors that have little to do with management performance'.76 Corporate managers have sometimes queried whether there is a direct connection between firm performance and their own performance when profits are below expectations.77 Recently, however, some senior members of the business community78 acknowledged that use of option grants and benchmarking executive pay against shareholder returns can generate an 'unearned windfall'79 in certain circumstances.
There has also been specific criticism of the use of options as a form of remuneration, on the basis that options may not offer rational or long term incentives toward improved performance.80 This is as a result of what might be termed 'the supermodel syndrome' in executive remuneration.81 As the current Australian commercial environment shows, corporate executives, like supermodels, have a potentially short shelf-life.82 In an era of takeovers and increased pressure from institutional investors,83 this may provide incentives to increase corporate profitability during their tenure (for example, by downsizing the workforce) rather than focusing on the long-term health of the organisation.84
There is increasing concern about the highly dilutive effects of option grants The introduction of a legal requirement to expense executive options now appears inevitable in Australia. In its CLERP 9 issues paper, the government expressed support for the adoption by the Australian Accounting Standards Board ('AASB') of the International Accounting Standards Board ('IASB') standard to require expensing of share options.90
IV EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION, POSITIONAL CONFLICT AND DISCLOSURE
A great man always considers the timing before he acts.
-Chinese proverb.91
There has thus been a growing recognition that the structure of many performance-based executive pay packages has been deficient and has used inappropriate benchmarks.92 This has led to a trend in finetuning of executive remuneration schemes. A widely held view is that the alignment of interests between management and shareholders is both desirable and possible -the devil is simply in the detail. Australia and the UK appear to have been well ahead of the US in finetuning option plans to include performance hurdles, although US organisations are now increasingly incorporating such restrictions.93
Nonetheless, several studies in the last few years have suggested that the problems with performance-based pay go well beyond mere structure, and that even carefully structured remuneration packages will frequently provide corporate managers with incentives to use their strategic advantage within the company to prefer their own interests over those of the shareholders.
It therefore appears that the 'positional' conflict, of which Professor Eisenberg spoke,94 is alive and well in the area of executive remuneration. Commentators have noted management's strategic advantage in the pay-setting process itself.95 Neither increased use of independent directors on compensation committees, nor specialist compensation consultants,96 is a complete panacea to management's strategic superiority in the pay-setting arena. Management's influence can ensure that pay packages are tailored to prevailing markets. During a bear market, for example, it is common to see a higher portion of fixed salary to options, than in a bull market. Management's influence can also ensure that pay packages are tailored to take account of the prevailing law97 and community attitudes.98
Furthermore, even when executive compensation packages are structured to incorporate a genuine element of risk, management can be insulated from its effects in a variety of ways. For example, downside risk has often been obviated by the repricing of options. Falling share prices in the US have led to a trend in favourable option repricings or swaps.99 It is interesting to note that an amendment to the Australian Stock Exchange ('ASX') Listing Rules attempts to address this problem, by requiring shareholder consent as a precondition to option repricing.100 The report of the Conference Board's Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise has recently recommended that approval by shareholders should be required under US law for all actions which could dilute their investment, including option repricing.101
Another development which potentially undermines risk in performance-based pay has been the rise of derivatives trading and hedging techniques. A number of US commentators have noted that it is possible for executives to neutralise the incentive effects of performance-based pay, and protect themselves from downside risk, by entering the derivatives market.102 This development potentially undermines not only the incentive policy of performance-based pay but also the 'just deserts' policy.
Studies have also recognised the danger that some performance indicators, such as share price, in executive remuneration could create perverse incentives for management to engage in misrepresentation of firm performance.103 It was recognised, for example, that large bonus entitlements might lead to 'income smoothing' practices.104 Interestingly, in the recent Towers Perrin report on international executive remuneration practices, Australia was one of only two countries in the world, where the rate of annual bonus to salary was higher than in the US.105 Management's discretion in relation to a range of corporate transactions, such as share buy-backs, may also be used to bolster share price.106
The prevalence of stock options could also provide incentives to manipulate the market price of the company's shares.107 The problem is particularly acute where the strike price for exercise of the option is set at the share price at the date of its issue (which has traditionally been the practice in the US, though not in Australia). In such circumstances, the most desirable and profit maximising scenario for any CEO is for the stock price to be relatively low at the time of issuance of the options, and relatively high at the exercise date. In th e area o f secu rities la w , d isc lo su re o f in fo rm a tio n is v ie w e d as a n e c e ssa r y p reco n d itio n to an e ffic ie n t m ark et114 and o n e o f th e u n d erly in g reg u la to ry g o a ls o f th e S ecu rities and E x ch a n g e C o m m issio n ( 'S E C ') is to en su re a le v e l p la y in g fie ld in a c c e ss to in fo rm a tio n . 2) creation o f a direct or contingent financial obligation that is material to the company, or events triggering such an material financial obligation; (3) a change in a rating agency decision, issuance o f a credit watch or change in a company outlook; (4) any material impairment; and (5) conclusion or notice that security holders no longer should rely on the company's previously issued financial statements or a related audit report. The time in which to make such filings after occurrence o f such an event would be reduced ftom five business days to two business days. In its release, the SEC asks whether this targeted approach to disclosure o f specifically delineated events should be replaced by 'a broad principle requiring companies to report highly important corporate events, leaving the company to determine the trigger for and scope o f the necessary disclosure' and 'if so, how should w e define the types o f events requiring disclosure?' These recent proposals indicate that the SEC, while expanding corporate disclosure obligations, continues to do so in a targeted way linked to the occurrence o f specific events and seems disinclined to m ove to a more general obligation o f continuous disclosure for all 'highly important' corporate events.
earnin gs a n n o u n cem en ts had, o n a v era g e, a b n orm ally n e g a tiv e returns in th e p erio d prior to th e an n o u n cem en t, w h ic h w a s again c o n siste n t w ith th e v ie w that th e C E O s o f th ese co m p a n ies w e r e m a n a g in g e x p ec ta tio n s d ow n w ard s. A b o o d y and K a sz n ik a lso d id an actual stu d y o f ea rn in gs a n n o u n cem en ts and fo u n d that C E O s w h o r e c e iv e d sto c k o p tio n s prior to th e an n o u n cem en t w e r e m o re lik e ly to is s u e b ad n e w s fo r eca sts, and le s s lik e ly to issu e g o o d n e w s fo reca sts than th o se w h o o n ly r e c e iv e d o p tio n s after the earn in gs a n n o u n cem en ts. T h e u n d erly in g m e s sa g e o f th e A b o o d y and K a szn ik stu d y is c o n sisten t w ith an earlier stu d y b y P ro fesso r D a v id Y e rm a ck 109 w h ic h fo u n d that, in th e co n te x t o f o p tio n grants m a d e o n an u n sc h e d u led b a sis, C E O sto c k o p tio n aw ards w e r e fo llo w e d b y sig n ific a n tly p o sitiv e abnorm al returns, and a stu d y b y P ro fesso rs K eith C h au vin and C ath erine S h e n o y ,110 w h ic h fou n d ab norm al sto c k p rice d ecr ea ses in th e 10 d a y p erio d im m e d ia te ly prior to an o p tio n grant date. S tu d ies o f th is k in d su g g e st that m a n a g e m e n t's strategic su p eriority w ith in the corporation -its p o sitio n a l c o n flic t -m a y en a b le it to d istort th e g o a ls and in d ic ia o f p erfo rm a n ce -b a se d p a y itse lf. A s in th e c a se o f h e d g in g , th e se stu d ies p o ten tia lly u n d erm in e th e 'ju st d ese r ts' ration ale o f p erfo rm a n ce-b a sed p a y . T h e stu d ies su g g e s t a p arad ox -n a m e ly that p erfo rm a n ce-b a sed p a y , a fo rm o f rem u n eration w h ic h w a s tou ted as a p a n a c ea for th e p ro b le m o f m isa lig n m e n t o f in terests b e tw e e n m a n a g em en t and sh areh old ers, h a s it s e lf b e c o m e a n e w so u rce o f in terest m isa lig n m e n t.111 Y e t, a k e y is s u e in th is regard is h o w m u ch a u to n o m y and d iscretio n e x e c u tiv e s a ctu a lly h a v e in regard to d isc lo su re o f corporate in form ation . T h e p o sitio n a l c o n flic t argu m en t a ssu m es that m a n a g em en t h a s a h ig

Y e t, in sp ite o f c o m m itm e n t to the id e a l o f in form ation al e ffic ie n c y , U S la w h as n ev e r a d o p ted a co n tin u o u s d isc lo su re re g im e. R ather, th e tradition al U S m o d e l o f d isc lo su r e u n d er secu rities la w requ ired p u b lic ly traded corp oration s to m a k e sig n ific a n t p erio d ic d isc lo su r e s in the annual report, and le s s d eta iled d isc lo su r e s o n a q uarterly b a s is .116 F o llo w in g E nron and W orld C om , h o w e v e r , U S la w appears to b e m o v in g further in the d irection o f a h ig h er standard o f d isc lo su r e .117 112 On the vexed issue o f whether such a duty might exist under U S securities law, see Yablon and
C o n cern s in th e U S ab out th e e x iste n c e o f an u n e v e n p la y in g fie ld , w h e n se le c tiv e b riefin g s to a n a ly sts o ccu rred b e tw e e n quarterly d isc lo su r e d ates, le d to th e in trod u ction in 2 0 0 0 o f R e g u la tio n F D (F air D e a lin g ),118 w h ic h requires  liste d c o m p a n ie s to d is c lo se a n y m aterial n o n -p u b lic in fo rm a tio n to th e m arket, i f  it is d is c lo se d to a n a ly sts.119 H o w e v e r , rather than lea d in g to greater gen eral  d isse m in a tio n o f corporate in form ation , it h a s b e e n argu ed that R e g u la tio n F D  m a y h a v e h ad a c h illin g e f fe c t and le d to le s s in fo rm a tio n in th e m ark etp lace b y  d isc o u r a g in g c o m p a n ies from b riefin g a n a ly sts.120 h i th eory, th erefore, u nd er U S sec u r itie s la w , it is p o s s ib le fo r m a n a g em en t 
UNSWLaw Journal Volume 25(2) w h ic h p ro v id e s that:
Once an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the entity's securities, the entity must immediately tell ASX that information.122
O n its fa c e , A S X L istin g R u le 3.1 appears to im p o se an o b lig a tio n on corporate m an agers to d is c lo s e all m aterial facts a b o u t th eir co m p a n ie s a s so o n as  th e y b e c o m e aw are o f th em . N o n e th e le s s, in p ra ctice, it appears that m a n a g em en t  still retain s co n sid era b le d isc retio n ab ou t tim in g o f d isc lo su re . F or a start, th The information concerns an incomplete proposal or negotiation. c)
The information comprises matters o f supposition or is insufficiently definite to warrant disclosure. d)
The information is generated for the internal management purposes o f the entity. e)
The information is a trade secret. E n fo rce m en t o f th e co n tin u o u s d isc lo su r e reg im e h a s a lso b e e n a to p ica l issu e. co n tin u o u s d isc lo su re b r e a c h e s,127 A S I C 's chairm an argu ed that th e regulator  la ck ed e ffe c tiv e en fo r cem en t p o w e r s, lo b b y in g fo r th e a b ility to im p o se  ad m in istrative fin e s o n corp oration s in b reach o f their co n tin u o u s d isc lo su re  o b lig a tio n s.128 A 2 0 0 1 research report129 on th e co n tin u o u s d isc lo su r e reg im e a lso co n clu d e d that th ere w a s e v id e n c e o f la ck o f candour b y m a n y co m p a n ies in th eir d isc lo su re a c tiv itie s, p articu larly c o m p a n ie s in th e n e w te c h n o lo g y area.
In sp ite o f th e ex p a n sio n , u nd er th e Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (C th ), o f th e c iv il p en a lty p r o v isio n s to c o v e r m arket m isc o n d u c t o ffe n c e s , in clu d in g
T 
V EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION AND CORPORATE COLLAPSE
Increasingly, I have become concerned that the motivation to meet Wall Street earnings expectations may be overriding common sense business practices ... As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial reporting. Management may be giving way to manipulation; integrity may be losing out to illusion.
-Arthur Levitt, ex-Chairman, SEC.134 T h e se corporate c o lla p se s co n firm that, as a resu lt o f m a n a g em en t's p o sitio n a l c o n flic t o f in terest and its p o w e r s and d iscretio n s o v e r fin a n cia l reporting and d isc lo su r e , p erfo rm a n ce-b a sed p a y p a c k a g e s m a y p ro v id e e x e c u tiv e s w ith in c e n tiv e s to m a x im ise their o w n w e a lth at th e e x p e n se o f th e co m p a n y , its sh areh olders and oth er stak eh old ers. F in etu n in g o f p erfo rm a n ce-b a sed p a y p a c k a g e s m a y red u ce, b u t is u n lik e ly to elim in a te, th ese dangers.
T h e e v e n ts at S u n b eam in 1 9 9 8 ,135 w h ic h w e r e treated b y m a n y as an aberration at th e tim e , rep resen ted a w a rn in g sig n a l fo r later corporate c o lla p se s. In m id -1 9 9 8 , after a p erio d o f esc a la tin g share p rice and apparently strong p erfo rm a n ce b y S u n b ea m u nd er th e red ou b ta b le A1 D u n la p ,136 th e fin a n cia l jo u rn al, Barron's, p u b lish e d an article a lle g in g that a c c o u n tin g g im m ick ry had created the illu sio n o f p rofit at S u n b ea m in th e p re v io u s y e a r .137 A fe w d a y s later, S u n b e a m 's board, d isc o v e r in g that sa le s fo r th e n e x t quarter w e r e U S $ 6 0 m illio n b e lo w e x p ec ta tio n s, r e m o v e d D u n la p as C E O . R ev erb era tio n s fro m th ese ev e n ts h a v e co n tin u ed sin c e that tim e. O n 4 S ep tem b er 2 0 0 2 , A1 D u n la p en tered into a settlem e n t o f fraud ch arges b rou gh t b y th e S E C , in w h ic h h e w a s p erm a n en tly b a n n ed from a ctin g as a director or o ffic e r o f an y p u b lic c o m p a n y and fin ed U S $ 5 0 0 0 0 0 .138 A n array o f repu tab le corporate g o v er n a n ce m ech a n ism s w a s e m p lo y e d at S u n b ea m to en su re that m a n agerial in terests w e r e a lig n e d w ith sh areh old er in terests, and D u n la p p ro cla im e d that h e w a s 'in lo c k step w ith the sh a reh o ld ers'.139 H is salary w a s p red om in an tly p erfo rm a n ce-b a sed and d irecto rs' sa la ries w e r e p a id en tirely in sh a res.140 N o n e th e le s s, a c lo se r ex a m in a tio n o f A1 D u n la p 's rem u neration su g g e sts that it m a y h a v e b e e n a ffe c te d b y b oth p o sitio n a l c o n flic t and p erv erse in c e n tiv e s. D u n la p 's strategic p o w e r w ith in th e corporation w a s ev id e n t in the settin g o f h is p a y . A lth o u g h D u n la p in itia lly en tered into a three y ea r con tract w ith S u n b ea m ,141 e ig h te e n m on th s later h e n e g o tia te d a n e w co n tra ct w ith th e board, in sp ite o f so m e d isa p p o in tin g fin a n c ia l resu lts. A fter th e co m p a n y 's c o lla p se , it a lso em e r g e d that E nron p a id its e x e c u tiv e s h u g e p erfo rm a n ce-b a sed b o n u se s in 2 0 0 1 , b a se d u p o n their s u c c e s s in rea ch in g certain sto c k p rice ta r g ets.160 It w a s su b se q u en tly sh o w n th at th e se targets w ere rea ch ed v ia m an ip u lation o f a cc o u n ts, w h ic h had th e e f fe c t o f in fla tin g E n ron 's p ro fits b y up to U S $ 1 b illio n .161 W h en th e n e w s o f th e E nron b o n u se s em erg ed , a form er fed eral w h ite -c o lla r crim e p rosecu tor w a s reported as sa y in g , '[t]h e le v e ls o f co m p e n sa tio n that w e are ta lk in g ab out h ere w o u ld certa in ly se e m to b e a p o w e r fu l in c en tiv e for a n y o n e to do a n y th in g '.162 T here is a lso e v id e n c e su g g e stin g that th e structure o f e x e c u tiv e rem u neration p T h ere is thus an in h eren t te n sio n b e tw e e n th e co n c e p t o f p o sitio n a l c o n flic t o f in terest and th e u n d erly in g ten ets o f p erfo rm a n ce-b a sed p a y . P erfo rm a n ce-b a sed p a y a ssu m es that m arkets and appropriately d e sig n e d rem u neration con tracts can con strain corporate m an agers, fo r cin g th em to a ct las if th e y had th e interests sh a reh o ld ers' interests at h eart'. 174 P o sitio n a l c o n flic t o f in terest, o n th e other hand , a ssu m e s that m a n a g em en t can con trol m a rk ets175 and h a s th e strategic p o w e r to p refer its o w n in terests to th o se o f shareh olders.
T h ere is currently a m ajor re a sse ssm e n t o f e x e c u tiv e p a y o ccu rrin g in a n u m b er o f cou n tries. T here is a trend tow ard s greater fin etu n in g o f e x e c u tiv e p a y p a c k a g e s and greater in v o lv e m e n t b y sh areh old ers. Y e t th e reg u la to ry le s s o n o f p o sitio n a l c o n flic t is that, w h ile th e se m a y b e d esira b le d e v e lo p m e n ts, th e y are b y n o m ea n s fa il-sa fe corporate g o v er n a n c e m e ch a n ism s in rela tio n to e x c e s s iv e rem u neration .
